This study conducts a comparison analysis on the efficiency of bookbuilding and secondary market proportional offering (hereafter, SMP offering) in the China stock market. SMP offering as described in this paper is not a follow-on offering, but an initial offering applicable to investors in the secondary market.
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Introduction
A substantial body of evidence indicates that there is a tendency for initial public offerings (IPOs) to appear underpriced on the first day of trading (see recent reviews in Ritter and Welch 2002; Ritter 2003; Ljungqvist 2007) . 1 It has been widely argued that a deeper understanding of the role of issuing mechanisms might help inform aspects of the unsolved puzzle of IPO underpricing. An appropriate choice and deployment of issuing mechanisms might ameliorate the impact of information asymmetry between issuers and investors (Neupane and Poshakwale 2012) . Ritter (2002) summarizes three principal types of globally employed issuing mechanisms: auction, bookbuilding, and fixed price offerings, which differ mainly in price discovery and share allocation process. The seminal study of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argues that bookbuilding can lead to more efficient price discovery as it allows underwriters to determine at what price to offer an IPO based on the demand from institutional investors. Numerous subsequent studies show that bookbuilding is associated with a lower level of IPO underpricing (see Benveniste and Wihelm 1990; Sherman 2000) . Although bookbuilding is becoming increasingly dominant worldwide and estimated to account for over 80% of IPOs outside the US and Canada (Ljungqvist et al. 2003) , international evidence on the efficiency of bookbuilding is rather mixed, showing that the choice of issuing mechanisms and the level of underpricing vary across markets. For example, in contrast to the conventional viewpoint, Busaba and Chang (2010) argue that, on average, fixed price offering produces higher expected proceeds, unless the underwriter can target its bookbuilding to a small subset of informed investors. Ljungqvist et al. (2003) empirically examine a sample of 2,143 IPOs in 65 stock markets outside the US in the 1990s. They report an average underpricing of around 20% for fixed price offerings (close to that for IPOs using bookbuilding), implying that fixed price offering still remains an efficient, low cost way to distribute IPO shares. Degeorge et al. (2010) also suggest that auction can be an effective alternative to traditional bookbuilding.
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In contributing to this debate, this study sheds additional light on the efficiency of issuing mechanisms for pricing IPOs in the China stock market, which has experienced tremendous development in IPO activities in the last two decades. Our particular attention on the China stock market is motivated by the following considerations. First, there exist several basic and substantially different issuing mechanisms in the China stock market, such as auction, bookbuilding, and various types of fixed price offering, including online fixed price offering, secondary market proportional offering (hereafter, SMP offering), and bookbuilding plus SMP offering, etc. The China stock market, therefore, offers an ideal arena to address the challenging question of which issuing mechanism is more efficient for pricing IPOs in a single-country context. In particular, SMP offering as described in this paper is not a follow-on offering (or a dilutive 1 A routinely updated Table 1 in Loughran et al. (1994) Jagannathan et al. (2015) conduct a comparative review of the three most common types of IPO issuing mechanisms in 47 international markets and provide potential explanations on why auction is unpopular in most markets. We note, but do not explore, the existence of numerous studies on the efficiency of auction-related issuing mechanisms (see Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet 2002; Derrien and Womack 2003; Sherman 2005; Lowry et al. 2010 ).
2 secondary offering), 3 but an initial offering applicable to investors in the secondary market. The distinguishing feature of SMP offering is that it only allows the existing investors who are holding shares (of any listed firms) in the secondary market to subscribe to IPO shares. The right to buy IPO shares depends on whether investors are holding shares in the secondary market, while the amount of IPO shares available to be subscribed by the existing investors is proportional to market value of shares held by them.
Furthermore, although the China stock market has become one of the largest and most important emerging markets in the world, its institutional settings and trading practices are relatively new and, in part, different from and independent of those in developed markets. For example, the dominance of individual investors, the existence of a majority of non-tradable shares (or the split-share structure), and the long gap between the offering and listing dates for IPOs have been extensively criticized as an indicator of bureaucratic control, operating inefficiency, and severe information asymmetry (Chan et al. 2004) . As a result, it takes longer for any information to be fully reflected in asset prices, which can cause the role of issuing mechanisms in emerging markets to be distinct from that in developed markets.
As a transitional institutional setting, SMP offering was built on the existence of the split-share structure in the China stock market. The primary purpose of the implementation of SMP offering is to reduce the IPO subscription costs for investors in the secondary market. With the formal launch of the split- Indeed, although the severe level of IPO underpricing in the China stock market has been well reported (see Mok and Hui 1998; Chan et al. 2004) , previous studies pay little attention to the explanatory power of issuing mechanisms. Yong (2007) conducts a comprehensive review of research on Asian IPOs and points out that this research area is still lacking and worth looking into. A recent study of Ma and Faff (2007) examines an early sample of 942 Chinese IPOs issued over the period 1994 to 2003 and supports the idea that bookbuilding increases pricing accuracy and is optimal in counteracting adverse market conditions. However, given the chosen sample period, they compare a very limited sample of 51 IPOs using bookbuilding with 891 fixed price offerings, making their empirical results somewhat unrepresentative.
3 Guo and Brooks (2008) also account for various issuing mechanisms in the China stock market before 2005, but their sample does not include any IPOs using bookbuiding.
This study comparatively examines the efficiency of various issuing mechanisms using a more recent sample of 523 IPOs in the China stock market over the period April 2001 to September 2008. We also include an out-of-sample of 90 IPOs issued over the period July 2009 to October 2012 for robustness analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study focusing on a comparison of the efficiency of bookbuilding and SMP offering (a dominant fixed price offering) in the China stock market. The primary objective of this study is to test two criteria proposed by Derrien and Womack (2003) for assessing the efficiency of IPO issuing mechanisms. That is, an efficient issuing mechanism is able to (i) lead to lower underpricing and lower cross-sectional variation of initial returns, and (ii) counteract adverse market conditions in the form of low market return and/or high market volatility. This study provides some interesting evidence to complement the existing finance literature, and has important relevance to market participants and financial regulators. In addition, market practitioners generally suggest that the typical aim of underwriters is not only to underprice, but to control aftermarket price variations, especially on the downside (Derrien and Womack 2003) . Inferring from this, we would expect that an efficient issuing mechanism is reflected in both lower underpricing and lower variance proxied by the cross-sectional squared deviations of IPO underpricing.
We are not aware of any previous study that examines the impact of market conditions on the variance of IPO underpricing in an emerging market context. We find that market conditions in terms of market return and volatility have significantly positive impacts on the variance of short-run returns of IPOs.
Finally, the most important finding of this study is that, compared with bookbuilding, SMP offering is associated with greater efficiency for pricing IPOs, in particular, in the face of adverse market return and volatility. It could be due to the fact that SMP offering makes the secondary market existing investors as signal conduits because of their experience of firm performance in different market conditions. These experienced investors have phenomenal knowledge of share ownership of issuers in the stock market and are better able to deal with noisy signals; this is not necessarily the case for bookbuilding. In this way, the behavior of these secondary market existing investors could be intentionally followed by less-informed investors in making decisions concerning potential IPO investment. Therefore, the quality of signals is 4 better in SMP offering (see more discussions in Subsection 2.2). Our results are robust to various alternative tests, e.g., the Heckman (1979) No. 86 [2005] ), providing guidelines on the implementation of the splitshare structure reform. 7 As the China stock market was at an early development stage, neither institutional nor individual investors were able to determine the value of an issuer, resulting in some overheated IPOs with very high offering P/E ratios in 2000. For example, Fujian Mindong Electric Power Co., Ltd. (000993) went public on the SZSE with a record high P/E ratio of 88.69 on July 31st, 2000. To cool down the overheated IPOs with excessively high P/E ratios, on July 1st, 2001, the CSRC introduced an upper limit on the P/E ratio of 20, which was lifted in 2005, though, in practice, the CSRC did not approve IPOs with a P/E ratio of greater than 30. 8 Several experimental auction mechanisms were implemented in 1994 and 1995. Specifically, issuers and underwriters set an initial price and investors were required to bid for both price and quantity. The final offering price was set at the level where the accumulative quantities demanded by investors were equal to the total number of new shares available. However, only four IPOs issued between June 1994 and January 1995 employed this auction mechanism. Furthermore, two pro rata mechanisms were introduced by the CSRC on December 16th, 1996. Investors were required to save enough money to subscribe to IPO shares in special accounts, and IPO shares were allocated pro rata in case of over-subscription. The two pro rata mechanisms were widely adopted in 1996 and 1997, but were never used after 1998. A summary description of relevant issuing mechanisms employed in the China stock market over the period from 1994 to 2003 is presented in Ma and Faff (2007 preventing those investors from making overpriced subscriptions but then default. Furthermore, the total subscription volumes made in the cumulative bidding inquiry session must be no less than those planned in the preliminary inquiry session. Since then, the preliminary price inquiry has become a key element in the bookbuilding process, marking the establishment of a more market-oriented issuing mechanism in the China stock market (see Deng and Zhou 2016) .
In accordance with the unified arrangements on reforming IPO issuing mechanism, the CSRC investors may agree on a minimum holding period of IPO shares on their own. After prospectuses are published, issuers and leading underwriters may communicate with certain institutions non-publicly and learn about their pricing intentions, to make predictions about the offering price range; other legal and feasible approaches may also be employed. Issuers and leading underwriters may directly set the final offering price according to the consultations in the preliminary inquiry session; alternatively, they may set the offering price range through the preliminary inquiry session and then determine the final offering price (within the offering price range) in the cumulative bidding inquiry session.
Hypothesis development
Theoretical work in explaining IPO underpricing always assumes that market participants are rational and the objective of issuers is to maximize the funds raised in a given market condition and market structure in the knowledge that there exist heterogeneous investor groups (see Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet 2002; Ritter and Welch 2002; Kennedy et al. 2006; Ljungqvist et al. 2006) . As noted by Sherman and Titman (2002) , information asymmetry has a substantial impact on the accuracy of the IPO pricing process. Specifically, it should be more difficult to estimate accurately the value of an issuer in a volatile market, which gives rise to the potential emergence of more severe information asymmetry. 9 Rock (1986) predicts that, on average, issuers characterized by more severe information asymmetry tend to be more underpriced, a prediction that has received considerable empirical support (see Kennedy et al. 2006 ).
Bookbuilding is a systematic process by which an underwriter (investment bank) appointed by the issuer attempts to determine the offering price of an IPO based on the demand from institutional investors.
The traditional viewpoint generally argues that bookbuilding can lead to more efficient price discovery and less severe information asymmetry, due to its advantage in information collection and the full discretion of share allocation by underwriters (see Benveniste and Spindt 1989; Benveniste and Wihelm 1990; Sherman 2000) . It is expected that underwriters, as financial intermediaries in the new issue market, play an important role as information producers to reduce information asymmetry surrounding issuers. However, some evidence from regulatory settlements and the financial press highlights the difficulty of underwriters in accurately pricing IPOs during the share allocation process. For example, during the road show session, the process of promoting an IPO firm to institutional investors fails to resolve much of the uncertainty in the market, probably because underwriters have allocated more underpriced IPOs to institutional investors who can pay large brokerage commissions (see Binay et al. 2007 ). Moreover, Krigman et al. (2001) and Houston et al. (2006) argue that price discovery is not the only service provided by underwriters, and accurate price discovery may not always be their primary objective. In fact, underwriters make more efforts in the 8 provision of auxiliary services, such as price support, market making, and analyst coverage, etc., rather than striving to minimize pricing errors in the IPO process. Many issuers thus place a very high value on underwriters' ability in order to guarantee certain post-IPO services. This might explain the dominance of bookbuilding worldwide despite its lack of accurate price discovery (see Ljungqvist et al. 2003; Lowry et al. 2010 ).
In addition, the available evidence casts doubts on bookbuilding as an efficient issuing mechanism of conveying public information, that is, public information seems not be fully incorporated into the offering price when the role of heterogeneous investor groups is recognized and information asymmetry emerges (see Bradley and Jordan 2002; Loughran and Ritter 2002; Lowry and Schwert 2004) . In particular, when the market is volatile and signals are noisy, then the impact of information flows on different investor groups becomes blurred, we could expect the IPO price distribution to be wider and underpricing to grow faster than that observed under a benign market condition (Beatty and Ritter 1986) . In this type of situation, the price-based market mechanism cannot ex ante fully resolve uncertainty relating even to public information; investors naturally then look to non-price information signals and one approach is for lessinformed investors to rely more heavily on the purchasing action of informed investors. 10 This is a type of information cascades in which investors infer relevant information from the observed behavior of those presumed to hold superior information in the market (Ritter and Welch 2002) .
It is in this context that SMP offering has an advantage in a more efficient manner, because SMP offering targets an investment community--the existing investors who are holding shares in the secondary market. Specifically, SMP offering requires IPO shares to be sold only to investors who have already held shares (of any listed firm) in the secondary market. SMP offering makes these existing investors in the secondary market as signal conduits, as they have plenty of experience of firm performance in the stock market from their ownership of shares over a period of time, and thus are better able to deal with noisy signals and discern how issuers will perform in different market conditions; this is not necessarily the case for bookbuilding. In this way, less-informed investors ignore their own noisy information and intentionally follow the observed behavior of secondary market existing investors in making decisions concerning potential IPO investment. Therefore, SMP offering is expected to more effectively reduce the level of information asymmetry and potentially contribute to more accurate price discovery. Derrien and Womack (2003) argue that underwriters aim not only to underprice, but also to control aftermarket price variations. Lowry et al. (2010) propose a new metric for evaluating the pricing of IPOs--the volatility of initial returns, which is positively related to the level of underpricing. Inferring from this argument and according to the above discussions, we test the following two main hypotheses: 10 Loughran et al. (1994) argue that, under information asymmetry, the existing shareholders and managers have information advantages over prospective investors in regard to the issuer, as prospective investors rely primarily on financial statements in the prospectuses, which are supposed to be presented in a favorable manner. That is, issuers might boost earnings relative to cash flows before the IPO and the profitability declines after the IPO. Therefore, prospective investors cannot effectively identify the quality of issuers, leading to an adverse selection problem, and eventually a lemon market (Beatty and Ritter 1986; Rock 1986; Balvers et al. 1993; Mantell 2016 Mok and Hui (1998) bookbuilding into the China stock market--does not contribute to reduce the level of information asymmetry and to counteract the adverse market condition during our sample period. Table 3 shows that the mean and variance of initial returns are persistent for up to 60 trading days (equivalent to three months) after listing. For example, the mean market-adjusted three-month buy-andhold abnormal returns (BHARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of all IPOs in our sample are 94.87% (σ = 91.41%) and 112.70% (σ = 91.02%), respectively, suggesting that IPO underpricing is not a first day temporary price pressure phenomenon in the China stock market.
Descriptive statistics
<Table 3>
Empirical results
Preliminaries
We initially examine whether a specific issuing mechanism is more efficient than others for pricing IPOs.
We introduce three dummy variables of BB, BS, and SMP, which represent BB, BS, and SMP offerings in Eq. (1) (1) and (6), respectively, very close to those on BS, i.e., 0.2824 (t-stat = 1.58) and 0.2253 (t-stat = 1.29) in Regressions (1) and (6), respectively, which could be explained by the similar characteristics between BS and SMP offerings, given the fact that a majority of IPOs shares (73.02%, on average) of BS offerings are actually allocated using SMP offering. 15 However, the dummy variable of BB generates much higher and statistically significant 14 We test the potential influence of multicollinearity in the regression analyses by calculating the variance inflation factors (VIFs). VIF is defined as 1/(1 -R 2 ), where R 2 is obtained from the regression of one variable on all other regressors specified in the regression model. All of multiple regressions yield a value of VIF of less than 2.5, much smaller than the commonly accepted threshold of 10, indicating no evidence of multicollinearity in the regression analyses. 15 Given the limited sample of 18 BS offerings and the fact that over 70% of IPO shares of BS offerings are actually allocated using SMP offering, we replicate all regression analyses either excluding all BS offerings in our sample or combining BS and SMP 12 coefficients of 0.5870 (t-stat = 2.37) and 0.4489 (t-stat = 2.21) in Regressions (1) and (6), respectively, at the 5% level. Thus, our preliminary results support H1 that, compared bookbuilding, SMP offering is a more efficient issuing mechanism in reducing the level of IPO underpricing.
<Table 4>
4.2
The impact of market conditions on the level of IPO underpricing
We then test whether market conditions (market return and volatility) have an impact on the level of IPO underpricing. Given no specific priors on the length of the pre-offering period that might affect the level of underpricing, we investigate several different time periods which encompass the time frame when an IPO is being planned and implemented. Thus, for each IPO on the SHSE or SZSE, the market return variables are constructed for the one-week (MktRet_1w), one-month (MktRet_1m), and three-month (MktRet_3m) periods before the offering date as an estimate of the buy-and-hold return (BHR) on the SHSE or SZSE AShare Index, respectively. Also, a one-month weighted market return variable (MktRet_3w) is constructed as a weighted average BHR of the corresponding market index return in three months prior to offering. The weights are three for the most recent month, two for the next, and one for the third month prior to offering, based on the assumption that investors' perceptions take the last three months into account, but give heavier weight to recent periods (Derrien and Womack 2003 
The left side of Table 4 shows that all market return variables are statistically and economically positive and significant in Regressions (2-5) with the use of IR as the dependent variable. For example, in Regression (5), the market return variable of MktRet_3w is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat = 4.17), while the coefficient of 3.0158 also suggests that an increase on market return of 1% monthly, on average, gives rise to an additional increase of 3.0158% on the first day return. In addition, the explanatory power of Regression (5), an adjusted R 2 of 0.2631, is driven by the market return variable, as the adjusted R 2 is substantially reduced to 0.0637 in Regression (1) when the market return variable is not included. The right side of Table 4 shows a similarly positive impact of market return on the short-run underpricing of IPOs in Regressions (7-10), using BHAR60 as the dependent variable. In the rest of the study, we report the results with the use of MktRet_3w as the major market return variable.
We further test whether market conditions in terms of market volatility (MktVol_1m), measured as the standard deviation of the daily return of the relevant SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index in one month prior to offering, have an impact on the level of IPO underpricing. In addition to a set of firm-specific control 
We find that the market volatility variable (similar to the market return variable) also plays an important role in explaining the level of IPO underpricing. For example, the left side of Table 5 shows statistically and economically significant coefficients of MktVol_1m, 3.8488 (t-stat = 2.67) and 3.8161 (tstat = 2.61), at the 1% level, in Regressions (11) and (13), respectively, using IR or BHAR60 as the dependent variable.
<Table 5>
Market practitioners generally suggest that the typical aim of underwriters is not only to underprice, at least modestly, but also to control aftermarket price variations, especially on the downside (Derrien and Womack 2003) . Inferring from this, we would suggest that an efficient issuing mechanism is reflected in lower underpricing and/or lower variance proxied by the cross-sectional squared deviations of IPO underpricing. In this study, we also examine the impact of market conditions on the variance of IPO underpricing, which is assumed to be related to the same firm-specific characteristics that are posited to affect the level of underpricing. The dependent variables of squared deviations of IR and BHAR60 used in
Regressions (15) and (17) are constructed as the squared residuals from Regressions (11) and (13), respectively. The right side of Table 5 shows that market conditions in terms of both market return and market volatility have a significantly positive impact on the variance of IPO underpricing.
In sum, the results presented in Table 5 confirm that market conditions, in terms of both market return and volatility in the near-term months before the offering dates, have statistically significant impacts on the mean and variance of initial and short-run underpricing of IPOs.
The impact of issuing mechanisms on the control of market conditions
We finally construct two additional sets of market conditional issuing mechanism (interaction) variables: 
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The left side of We also report the impact of recent market volatility on IPO underpricing across various issuing mechanisms. Table 5 shows that MktVol_1m×BB exhibits a statistically significant effect at the 1% level (coefficient = 3.8999; t-stat = 2.98) in Regressions (12), which is much stronger than MktVol_1m×OFP (18) with the use of the squared deviation of BHAR60 as the dependent variable. Thus, we confirm that the variability of initial and shortrun underpricing is more sensitive to market volatility for bookbuilding than for SMP and OFP offerings.
16 Following Clogg et al. (1995) , we employ z-statistics to test the statistical difference between the two interaction coefficients:
In sum, the two sets of market condition results support H2 that, from a conditional point of view, SMP offering is more efficient in counteracting adverse market conditions as it seems to be largely immune from the impact of market return and volatility.
Robustness tests
Controlling for the problem of endogeneity
Much theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the choice of IPO issuing mechanism might be endogenously determined (see Ljungqvist and Wihelm 2002; Derrien and Womack 2003) . If this is the case, the problem of endogeneity could possibly bias our previous regression coefficients and conclusions. To address the potential self-selection bias and to confirm the validity of our previous conclusions, we employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure in this subsection.
In the first-stage regression, we use a probit model to estimate the probability that an issuer tends to choose SMP offering. The dependent variable is a binary dummy variable set to one if the issuer chooses SMP offering, and zero otherwise. Inspired by Ljungqvist and Wihelm (2002) 
<Table 6>
In addition, Table 6 shows that the inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage OLS regression is significantly positive in Regressions (20-23) at the 5% level. The statistical significance of λ implies the importance of taking the problem of endogeneity into account. The second-stage regression results show that the coefficients and statistical significances of other independent variables remain qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 5 , again confirming that SMP offering is more efficient in controlling for adverse market conditions in the form of lower market return and/or higher market volatility.
Out-of-sample test
To further test the robustness of our results, we extend our analysis to account for the potential influence of the exchange of listing. Specifically, since the launch of the SMEs Board in June 2004, the SZSE has been specially designed for young, small and medium size firms in the high-tech industry sector, while the SHSE features more established firms. As such, both stock exchanges are likely to have different risk profiles that will influence the level of IPO underpricing. Therefore, we replicate all tests in Table 5 , exclusively using an out-of-sample of 343 IPOs on the SHSE over the period April 2001 to October 2012:
146 for BB, 26 for OFP, and 171 for SMP. The regression results shown in Table 7 are qualitatively the same as those presented in Table 5 .
<Table 7>
More robustness tests
We conduct several additional robustness tests. For example, we winsorize the extreme values of the dependent variable of IR and BHAR60 at 1% and 99% prior to regression estimation, to avoid any potential misleading conclusions resulted from outliers. The results based on a trimmed sample are qualitatively the same, suggesting that outliers do not appear to be driving the results. Also, we use the pre-listing market condition variables in all regression equations, and again our results are qualitatively similar to those based on the pre-offering market condition variables.
Furthermore, Appendix shows that a total of 15 utilities (14 listed on the SHSE and one on the SZSE)
are included in our sample. Of the 15 utilities, five use bookbuilding, eight are SMP offerings, and two are BS offerings. We replicate all regression analyses with the use of a subsample of 508 IPOs excluding the 15 utilities. The regression results confirm that our previous conclusions--SMP offering leads to lower underpricing and lower cross-sectional variation of short-run returns of IPOs; SMP offering is better able to counteract adverse market conditions in the form of low market return and/or high market volatility--17 remain qualitatively unchanged. These results are not reported for the sake of brevity, but available on request.
Conclusions
The existence of several basic and substantially different issuing mechanisms in the China stock market offers an ideal arena to address the challenging question of which issuing mechanism is more efficient for pricing IPOs. This study aims to test two possible criteria for assessing the efficiency of any given IPO issuing mechanism, that is, whether an efficient issuing mechanism is able to lead to less underpricing and lower cross-sectional variation of initial returns, and able to counteract adverse market conditions in the form of low market returns and/or high market volatility (Derrien and Womack 2003) . Our empirical results
show that, compared with bookbuilding, SMP offering is associated with greater efficiency for pricing IPOs in the face of adverse market conditions. Our results are robust to various alternative tests after controlling for the problem of endogeneity and for the influence of exchange of listing.
Our results highlight the difficulty of underwriters in accurately pricing IPOs and cast doubts on bookbuilding as an efficient issuing mechanism of conveying public information during the share allocation process. Specifically, if the market is volatile and signals are noisy, then the impact of information flows on different investor groups becomes blurred. We could expect the IPO price distribution to be wider and underpricing to grow faster in a volatile market than that observed under a benign market condition (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) . In this type of situation, the price-based market mechanism cannot ex ante fully resolve uncertainty relating even to public information; investors naturally then look to non-price information signals, and one approach for less-informed investors is to rely heavily on the purchasing actions of informed investors.
It is in this context that SMP offering has an advantage over other issuing mechanisms, as it makes the use of secondary market existing investors as signal conduits. These experienced investors who are holding shares in the secondary market have phenomenal knowledge of share ownership of listed firms in different market conditions and are better able to deal with noisy signals. Their behavior could be intentionally followed by less-informed investors in making decisions concerning potential IPO investment.
Therefore, the quality of signals is expected to be better in SMP offering. As a transitional institutional setting, SMP offering was built on the existence of the split-share structure in the China stock market, in attempts to reduce the IPO subscription costs for investors in the secondary market. However, with the formal launch of the split-share structure reform in 2005, non-tradable shares were gradually converted into tradable shares and the foundation of SMP offering thus no longer existed. In recent years, the CSRC have formulated a series of regulations in attempts to establish a more market-oriented issuing mechanism in the China stock market. Whether these reforms really enhance the efficiency of the bookbuilding process and have significant influence on price discovery is left for future research. 
where FPi,1 and OPi,0 are the first trading day closing price and the offering price of IPO i, respectively; Ii,1 and Ii,0 are the corresponding SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index at the end of the first trading day and at the offering day of IPO i, respectively. The gross proceeds are presented in millions of RMB, adjusted using CPI (2005 = 100). Table 2 Descriptive statistics of IPOs across various issuing mechanisms   BB  BS  OFP  SMP  ALL   2001  10  0  26  0  36  2002  18  0  0  48  66  2003  0  0  0  65  65  2004  0  0  0  95  95  2005  0  15  0  0  15  2006  65  0  0  0  65  2007  104  3  0  0  107  2008  74  0  0  0  74   SHSE  56  3  26  171  256  SZSE  215  15  0  37 High-tech related issuers are confirmed when the IPO firm has some high-tech related contents, according to the ICB (see the distribution of all IPOs in our sample by the industry category in Appendix). All issuers are also identified by whether they are issued before or after implementing The Regulation 2004 on January 1st, 2005. LAG represents the gap (calendar days) between the offering and listing dates; STATE represents the fraction of tradable shares by total shares outstanding of the IPO firm; SIZE represents the raised aggregate gross proceeds of the IPO firm in millions of RMB, adjusted using CPI (2005 = 100); the marketadjusted initial return (IR) is computed as: , = ( ,1 ,0 ⁄ ) − ( ,1 ,0 ⁄ ), where FPi,1 and OPi,0 are the first trading day closing price and the offering price of IPO i, respectively; Ii,1 and Ii,0 are the corresponding SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index at the end of the first trading day and at the offering day of IPO i, respectively; Pre-offering (Pre-listing) market return represents the weighted average buy-and-hold return (BHR) of the corresponding returns on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index in three months prior to offering (prior to listing), where the weights are 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the next, and 1 for the third month prior to offering (Derrien and Womack 2003); Pre-offering (Pre-listing) market volatility represents the standard deviations of the daily returns of the relevant SHSE or SZSE A-share Index in one month prior to offering (prior to listing). Following the calculation introduced by Loughran and Ritter (1995) , we define the market-adjusted BHARi,t on IPO i as:
], where Ri,t and Rm,t are the daily return on IPO i and the corresponding market benchmark, respectively, in event day t following listing. The SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index provides the benchmark for IPOs on the SHSE or SZSE, respectively. The mean buy-and-hold abnormal return ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ on a portfolio of N IPOs for a holding period of t days is computed as:
. To control for the potential skewness bias in the short-run returns, we use the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics suggested by Lyon et al. (1999) , where ̂ is the estimate of the coefficient of skewness. The market-adjusted return ARit on firm i in event day t is defined as: ARi,t = Ri,t -Rm,t. The mean market-adjusted return ARt on a portfolio of N shares in event day t is computed as:
. Therefore, the cumulative market-adjusted returns CART from event day 1 to event day T are the summation of ARt: = ∑ =1 , while t-statistics of the CART are determined and computed using the methodology employed by Ritter (1991) as: ( ) = × √ ⁄ , where csdt is computed as:
where var is the mean cross-sectional variance over the 60 event days, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series. where LNSIZE represents the natural logarithm of the raised aggregate gross proceeds of the IPO firm in millions of RMB, adjusted using CPI (2005 = 100); TECH is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO firm has some high-tech related contents, according to the ICB, and zero otherwise (see the distribution of all IPOs in our sample by the industry category in Appendix); EXG is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO firm is listed on the SHSE, and zero otherwise; STATE represents the fraction of tradable shares by total shares outstanding of the IPO firm; REG is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO firm issues new shares after January 1st, 2005 when The Regulation 2004 was applicable, and zero otherwise; and BB, BS, and SMP represent bookbuilding (BB; 271 IPOs), bookbuilding plus secondary market proportional offering (BS; 18 IPOs), and secondary market proportional offering (SMP; 208 IPOs), respectively. The intercept term captures the effect of online fixed price offering (OFP; 26 IPOs). For each IPO on the SHSE or SZSE, the market return variables are constructed for the one-week (MktRet_1w), one-month (MktRet_1m), and three-month (MktRet_3m) periods before the offering date as the BHR on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. The three-month weighted market return variable (MktRet_3w) is constructed as a weighted average BHR of the corresponding market index return in three months prior to offering. The weights are three for the most recent month, two for the next, and one for the third month prior to offering (Derrien and Womack, 2003) . We also control for the potential year and industry fixed effects using indicator variables for years (YEAR) and industries (INDUSTRY), according to the two-digit ICB codes. White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. where the dependent variable is a binary dummy variable set to one if the issuer chooses SMP offering, and zero otherwise; LNLAG represents the natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and listing dates; NUMBER represents the number of IPOs issued during the six weeks before to two weeks after the issuer's offering date; the firm-specific control variables of LNSIZE, TECH, EXG, and STATE, market condition variables of MktRet_3w and MktVol_1m, and indicator variables of YEAR and INDUSTRY are as defined in Table 4 . The second-stage OLS regression includes the inverse Mills ratio (λ) derived from the first-stage regression as an additional regressor to correct for the self-selection bias. Specifically, = ( ) [1 − ( )] ⁄ , where ϕ represents the standard normal density function; Φ represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function; γ represents the first-stage probit estimation of the selection equation; Z represents the corresponding explanatory variables in the probit regression. IR of each IPO on the SHSE or SZSE is measured by the percentage difference between the first trading day closing price and offering price, relative to the contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. BHAR60 is measured as the market-adjusted threemonth BHR as shown in Table 3 . The squared deviations of IR and BHAR60 employed in Table 4 . The intercept term captures the effect of bookbuilding (BB). The interaction variables of MktRet_3w×BB, MktRet_3w×SMP, MktVol_1m×BB, and MktVol_1m×SMP are as defined in Table 5 . White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
* , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions explaining the mean and squared deviation of market-adjusted initial returns (IR) and three-month BHARs (BHAR60) with the use of 343 IPOs on the SHSE over the period April 2001 to October 2012. A total of three IPOs using bookbuilding plus secondary market proportional offering (BS) are excluded in the regression analysis due to the very limited sample. IR of each IPO on the SHSE or SZSE is measured by the percentage difference between the first trading day closing price and offering price, relative to the contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. BHAR60 is measured as the market-adjusted three-month BHR as shown in Table 4 . The intercept term captures the effect of online fixed price offering (OFP). The interaction variables of MktRet_3w×BB, MktRet_3w×OFP, MktRet_3w×SMP, MktVol_1m×BB, MktVol_1m×OFP, and MktVol_1m×SMP are as defined in Table 5 . White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. The level of IPO underpricing is measured as the adjusted average initial return, the percentage difference between the first trading day closing price and offering price, relative to the contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. The FTSE China A50 Index is a real-time, tradable index comprising the largest 50 A-Shares listed on the SHSE and SZSE by full market capitalization, which offers the optimal balance between representativeness and tradability for the China A-Share market. 
